

МИРОВАЯ ФИЛОСОФСКАЯ МЫСЛЬ: ПРОШЛОЕ И НАСТОЯЩЕЕ

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Images of Imagination for Iranian Philosophers

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This essay tries to provide an account of imagination, having an underlying position in various issues such as those of philosophy of art. Although philosophers like Farabi, Avicenna and Suhrawardi show some features of Aristotle's theory of imagination, they have expanded it thus new phases are added to it. Farabi conceptualizes imagination with three principal activities: storing sensory forms, composing and decomposing sensory forms, and imagery. Avicenna defines what Farabi calls the faculty of imagination as imagination, estimative and memory faculties. Suhrawardi criticizes Avicenna's theory and offers an internal explanation as well as an external one. He reckons imaginary perception as a kind of illuminated intuitive knowledge implying observation of suspended forms, positing upon which a stage of the universe out of mind.

Keywords: imagination, artistic creativity, Aristotle, Farabi, Avicenna, Suhrawardi

Having a special place in Muslim scientists' epistemic system, imagination theory plays a significant role in philosophy of art issues like what is art, art functions and artistic creativity. Any ambiguity in what imagination is results in various sophisms and destroys its role from efficiency. Here we study the problem of what is imagination with comparative historical approaches of Aristotle (322–384 BC), Farabi (339–258), Avicenna (373–428) and Suhrawardi (549–587). Aristotle in terms of influencing next philosophers, Farabi in terms of innovative theories about various roles of imagination and creativity of imagination, and Avicenna in terms of expansion in concept of imaginary faculties, and Suhrawardi as the founder of illuminated imagination theory are important for the purpose of this study.

We study what imagination is with both direct and indirect approaches. Direct approach means cases study that there is an explicit expression in the definition of imagination. Indirect approach means we don't have to seek a stipulated expression. But while a philosopher doesn't provide a definition for imagination, we should obtain this from his other views about imagination. Some instances of indirect approach are searchable perceptive kinds including sensory, imaginary, illusory and rational perceptions and also soul perceptual faculties such as *hasasah*, *motekhayelah*, *nateqah*, or in other words perceptive external faculties, perceptive esoteric faculties and rational faculties.

Aristotle

Most of Aristotle's imagination theories are in the book of *De Anima* [Aristotle, 1995, 427a18-429a4]. To know the nature of imagination, Aristotle first explains negatively what does not include in it and then says positively what it can include. He emphasizes on the difference of imagination with thinking, judgement, opinion, belief, conviction, reason, perceiving, knowledge and intelligence. He thinks that imagination is different from thinking and judgement. Although imagination can't be created without perceiving, judgement is not found without imagination. Therefore the difference between thinking and judgement is obvious. Because imagination is in our control when we want and we can imagine a picture [ibid., 427b14-19].

The idea that imagination under human power and desire do not merely mean being devoid of imagination because thinking is arbitrary too. Therefore, thinking is bound to logical criteria that we can obtain by following them whereas imagination is not bound to logical criteria and barriers. The other point is that imagination can rely on practical wisdom due to its characteristics, under human power and desire. Because the affairs belonging to practical wisdom are under human power and free will, whatever belonging to practical wisdom is worthy to be judged. We have dealt in detail this issue in problems of imagination topics.

Aristotle differs between imagination and opinion. His argument is that we are not free in forming opinions and cannot avoid error or correct alternation.

In addition, when we think that something is horrible or threatening, immediately interests and emotions are produced inside our body as well as for something reliable. But when we just imagine, we won't have those regrets and are like those who are watching a nice or horrible scene painting [ibid., 427b20-24].

Besides, opinion goes together with belief. Because without belief in what we have opinion power, we cannot have opinion whereas most animals have imagination not belief. Moreover each opinion is with belief, each belief is with conviction and each conviction is with reason. But some animals have imagination without reason [ibid., 428a18-23].

Aristotle separates imagination from perceiving by the reasoning that the perceiving is potential or actual. For example, visual potential and act of seeing and imagination occur in both absences as in dreams. The second reasoning is that perceiving is always available unlike the imagination. The third cause is that if the actual imagination and perceiving were the same, all animals should have imagination. But it is not so. For example, there is no imagination in ants, bees and worms. The fourth cause is that perceiving is always true unlike imaginations. The fifth cause, when our sensory feelings pay attention to the objects carefully, we don't say that we imagine this object is for example a human. But when our sense perception is vague about that object, we say that sentence that maybe it is true or not. The sixth and the last Aristotelian cause is that visual imagination appears even while our eyes remain closed [ibid., 428a5-16]. He separates imagination from the affairs which are always impressive like knowledge or intelligence, because imagination can be an error [ibid., 428a17-18].

Studying the differentiation of imagination from perceiving and opinion, Aristotle shows that imagination cannot be opinion in addition to perceiving, or opinion resulted from perceiving or combination of both. This is impossible, both due the things we have mentioned and the causes that objective opinion cannot differ from objective perception [ibid., 428a24-29].

Aristotle describes what imagination *is not*. But what *is* the imagination? He reckons imagination as a movement that cannot be created without perception. It means that it will occur just in sensitive creatures and in to objects belonging to them. And since movement can be produced from actual perception and has a similar characteristic to the perception itself, then this movement cannot be separated from the perception or in the creature without perception. Therefore, a person having imagination is the agent of many things and receptive to them [ibid., 428b11-17].

The characteristic of imagination is that it is similar to perception except that perception has to do material objects and imagination does not have one [ibid., 432a9].

Aristotle concludes that if the imagination does not have other features except above mentioned ones, then it should be a movement that results an actual reaction from a perceptive origin [ibid., 429a1-2].

He mentions in appellation of imagination to a Greek name *phantasia* from *phaos*, because imagination belongs to the perceiving act and is the greatest sense for sense of sight that is impossible without light [ibid., 429a1-4].

A word of warning is in order. Farabi has not used the term *phantasia* and Avicenna has used *phantasia* and *bantasia* as meaning *sensus communis*.

Motekhayelah and *khiyal* are not considered as two faculties in Aristotle's works as we could see later in conceptualization of Muslim philosophers especially in Avicenna that formed under than the five senses. Therefore, *takhayol* and *khiyal* are used as synonyms in the literal translation as imagination.

Farabi

Unlike what we have understood about Aristotle, Farabi does not point out *what is imagination* as a problem. He does not follow its essential analysis or its conceptual analysis. In such situations as in planning, one can obtain what is imagination from his view by an indirect approach. Therefore, we will address his opinion about different perceptions, i. e., sensory perception, imaginary perception and intellectual perception and self intellective faculties including the faculties of sensation, *motekhayelah*, and rational.

Farabi conceptualizes intellective faculties from both theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom whereas sages after him paid attention to intellective faculties through theoretical wisdom like Avicenna and Suhrawardi.

Farabi does not consider any difference between imagination faculty and *motekhayelah*. He mentions one faculty doing both activities and often calls it *motekhayelah* faculty and some times imagination faculty [Farabi, 1992, p. 51–58].

Avicenna explains these distinctions. Basically we cannot see Avicenna's explanation about fifth inner senses as we found in Farabi's works.

Farabi does not express separately about nature of perception. But he points to the kinds of perceptions in his other discussions. For example, he expresses in his talking about the first lover and pleasure that he enjoys in it. Because of feeling or imagination or rational science [Farabi, 2003, p. 85; 1997, p. 71] and says in his analysis of psychical faculties that the science will be realized by rational, *motekhayelah* or sensory faculties [ibid., p. 156].

In his opinion, rational faculty is responsible for intellectual perception, *motekhayelah* faculty for imaginary perception and appearance senses for the sensory perception.

Avicenna completed this theory. He conceptualizes illusion as a kind of perception. We cannot see this term in Farabi's works. Farabi has defined illusion as an imagination for something that is not existent [Farabi, 1987, p. 162].

Farabi has not defined faculty in his discussions about self faculties. Avicenna believes that faculty means both doing origin and acceptance origin. Because the affairs out of self includes movement and perception and faculty about perception means acceptance of origin and stimulation means action from origin. There is no preference to refer faculty to one of these two cases and if one use the term of faculty for both perception and stimulation faculties, namely both acceptance and doing origins; it will be due to sharing of terminology [Avicenna, 1983, p. 7].

Farabi explains self faculties according to its existing order and expresses their activities [Farabi, 2004, p. 10; 2003, p. 151–155]. Among these faculties is sensitive faculty including touch, sight, auditory, taste and smell senses. There is a dominant sense over appearance sense that is the focus of all sensory perceptions, and senses act like its spies

and each is responsible for a special case from information and a special area of the body estate whereas the *motekhayelah* faculty does not have several servants and agents in the body and will act lonely [Farabi, 2003, p. 153–154].

Motekhayelah faculty preserves the tangible images that are stamped in the self and also it combines some images with others or divides an image to some parts and therefore creates a new image. After *motekhayelah* faculty, rational faculty will be created that the human can think by it.

Farabi has emphasized conceptualization of perception faculties from practical wisdom in various situations [Farabi, 2003, p. 152; 2004, p. 11; 1997, p. 33]. He knows rational faculty as a faculty that human can differ between beautiful and ugly ethics and acts through it and thinks that which action should be left or continued and in addition finds that beneficial and harmful and enjoyable and ornery, whereas *motekhayelah* can just perceive the beneficial and harmful and enjoyable and ornery, and sensitive can perceive just enjoyable and ornery [Farabi, 1997, p. 33].

One of the definitions obtained through collection of an object's definitions and works that is called compound particular. Therefore, regarding the activities of *motekhayelah* faculty, important thing is to reach what it is.

Farabi has defined three important activities for *motekhayelah*. First, it preserves sensory perceptions after cutting sensory relation. Second, it combines or decomposes them. These combinations and decompositions are various and *motekhayelah* faculty governs them desirably. Their results are sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant [Farabi, 2003, p. 154]. For example, it will combine bird wing with the horse body or invent a Pegasus. The third activity is imitation and illustration. Only *motekhayelah* faculty can illustrate through sensibles and intelligibles. Even *motekhayelah* can imitate the intelligibles in the ultimate perfection like the first principle and the non materials. Of course it is illustrated by the most complete and highest objects such as beautiful objects and in contrast, it imitate incomplete intelligibles by incomplete and posts and ugly sensibles.

Since Farabi does not analyze what imagination is, we focus on his other views like of human faculties, Utopia ranks, stage of universe and body members.

He begins description of this similarity with the stages of universe. Creatures are continued from the most completed one to the most incomplete one. The last stage is that the creature's doings are just for service and other things are not realized after him and never does actions as headship. The first creature that is superior never performs service and the middle creatures perform headship rather than their lower creatures to serve the first creature.

So there will be an order and relationship and cooperation and community among stage of universal and the stage of society are the same. The status of the first header is like God in the universal system. The same relation can be found in body members and also in self faculties [Farabi, 1991, p. 63–66]. This similarity means *motekhayelah* faculty is under the service of rational faculty and sensitive faculty is under the service of *motekhayelah* faculty. In terms of stage and headship and design, the rational faculty is the first and *motekhayelah* and sensation are next in status of headship.

Avicenna

What is imagination can be conceptualized from two positions in Avicenna's discussion: the first is where he explains kinds of perceptions and the second is where he divides self internal faculties.

Imagination theory has been ordered and developed consequent to perception theory and perception faculties. Avicenna first studied kinds and essences of perceptions in *al-Isharat va al-Tanbihat* and then analyzed internal perception faculties and rational soul [Avicenna, 1997, p. 308–404]. He studied internal and external perception faculties, rational soul and kinds of perceptions in *al-Shifa* and argued in detail about each internal and external senses [See: Avicenna, 1983, p. 33–171].

Avicenna has divided perceptions into four kinds: feeling, imagination, illusion and intellection in most of his works [Avicenna, 1983, p. 51–53; 1986, p. 344–346; 1995, p. 277–278; 1985, p. 102–103; 1984, p. 23; 1953, p. 30–33].

Until there is a relation between external senses and external object, sensory perception is resulted, if not, it is imagined and its idea is exemplified inside. Like Zayd who we saw him and then we imagined him while he is absent.

Perception of particular meanings and belonging to sensibles are called illusion. Like Zayd's kindness or hostility. Intellection is resulted when Zayd is imagined as a human, meaning that this meaning has been realized in others too.

Avicenna has tripartite divisions of perception and does not mention the illusion [Avicenna, 1997, p. 322–323]. In *Sharh al-Isharat*, Tusi has all four divisions and tells the reason why the Avicenna did not mention illusion that sensory and imaginary conceptions are created alone and illusory perception is not possible without participation of imagination and imagination makes it particular and individualized. Because illusion is the perception of intangible meanings like the qualities and relations specific to a material object [Tusi, 1997, p. 324].

After analyzing kinds of perceptions, Avicenna studied internal intellectual faculties. In his opinion, internal perception faculties include *sensus communis* or *bantasia*, imagination or illustrated, illusion, *mote khayelah* or thought. He discussed these faculties with examples which we will discuss later [Avicenna, 1997, p. 331–346].

We see rain drops in straight line and a point which is turning quickly as a circle; these apprehensions are through sense, not imagination or recollection. On the other hand, only the opposite idea will be stamped in the eye and the opposite idea of the rain drop or the point turning is a point not a straight line or circle. Therefore, the first painted idea will remain in one of human faculties and the current idea will join it and all sensory apprehensions will be gathered in that faculty. This faculty is called *sensus communis* or *bantasia*.

The second faculty is imagination that will remain all paradigm of sensibles after getting hide against external senses. Having these two faculties of *sensus communis* and imagination, human can rule about the color and taste. For example this black date is sweet and this yellow lemon is sour.

The third faculty is illusion that understood intangible detailed meaning in detailed tangibles like sheep that knows the intangible meaning of horror in the wolf and the lamb that knows the intangible meaning of kindness in his mother.

The fourth faculty is memory to remain detailed meanings. This faculty is except imagination which remains particular forms. One of the other human faculties can separate and combine the forms that sense would conceptualize and the particular meanings that illusion has them and also it can separate and combine between forms and meanings. If this faculty will be worked with wisdom is called thought and if with illusion, will be called *mote khayelah*.

Tusi has called this faculty representation because it occupies in perceptions. Avicenna has determined a position for each kind of these five faculties in brain.

Suhrawardi

Suhrawardi has regarded Avicenna theories in his other workings except *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. He uses these courses in order to prepare and arrange the teaching and attain illuminationist teachings.

This probability is canceled that Suhrawardi believed to peripatetic basics in some of this workings and then changes his opinions. Because it is clear that *Hikmat al-Ishraq* and some other books of Suhrawardi, including Avicenna views, have been written simultaneously and for example there are some references to *Hikmat al-Ishraq* in *al-Mashareh and al-Motarehat* [Suhrawardi, 2002c, p. 164, 179, 210, 213].

Moreover, he has mentioned the order of his books in the beginning of *Hikmat al-Ishraq* and said to his followers that: ‘Before this book and during writing it... I have written some books by peripatetic method..., like *al-Talvihah al-Lohie wa al-Arshie* including... The other book is *al-Lamahat*. Other than those two things I have written, including during childhood.’ [Suhrawardi, 2002a, p. 10].

Suhrawardi’s Avicennian Voice. Suhrawardi considers four human perceptions like Avicenna and has expressed the characteristics of any kind and compared them [Suhrawardi, 2002d, p. 407–410].

He expresses vision as a sensory perception that only can understand the external form of an object and its accidents like color, position, place, quantity, and figure. And if the object is not in front of the eye, eye cannot perceive it, whereas imagination can understand the absent objects of the ostensible senses.

Imagination, perceives simulacrum more abstract than sight and simulacrum in imagination faculty is steadier than sensible forms of vision.

Therefore Suhrawardi has compared vision and imagination in three states of power, separation and permanence and considered imagination on top. He considers illusion perception, including meanings regarding to sensibles, more powerful than vision and imagination. Yet illusion cannot separate meanings from the sensibles and all three kinds of sensory, imaginary and illusion perceptions are physical and cannot be separated from matter.

But intellectual perception will find essences as they are. Suhrawardi interprets that intellectual perception can be possessed in the spiritual realm in the blink of an eye. Distinction between human and animal is in this perception that is abstract and its principle is from the spiritual world. Therefore it can find spiritual substances. Its place is not in human body but he looks at body and invisible world. Intellect is called human rational soul, heart, spirit and psyche too.

Because perceptions of vision, imagination and illusion are physical, they can only capture material world and cannot attain anything in the intellect infinite universe and if they want to find some forms in the world intellect, they can only find in a Physical matter. Vision and even imagination and illusion are all worthless comparing intellectual faculties.

Inward Senses. Suhrawardi has considered five inward senses in his different books as Avicenna and repeated some of his examples and written symbolic treatises based on Avicenna [Suhrawardi, 2002b, p. 179–182; 2002e, p. 201–203, 111–112; 2002d, p. 352–355, 130–132, 29–31, 87–88, 227, 249, 278–279, 331]. In *Hayakel al-Noor*, there is no *motekhayelah* faculty that can be because of pen blunder or writers’ errors.

He has regarded to ten appearance and inner senses in his treatise, *A Day with a Group of Sufis*, and ten senses has been expressed in the form of symbol and exemplification in the treatises of *The Red Intellect*, *On the Reality of Love* and *The Shrill Cry of Simurgh*.

Suhrawardi finds internal perceptive faculties including common sense, imagination, estimative, occupied and memory and explains these faculties as negligence method not based on research method [Suhrawardi, nd., p. 179].

Suhrawardi expressions are much similar to Avicenna and it is not need to repeat that. It should only be mentioned that Avicenna has not mentioned to imitation and representation in *motekhayelah* faculty sentences, whereas Suhrawardi has regarded this activity as well as its separation and composition. He knows *motekhayelah* as a faculty always moving, both in sleep and wake. *Motekhayelah* represents both temperament status and intellect news [Suhrawardi, 2002d, p. 30]. This specification of *motekhayelah* has been regarded by Farabi too.

Suhrawardi’s Illuminist Views about Inward Senses. Suhrawardi will represent a different view from Sino attitude about faculties of imagination, *motekhayelah*, illusion and memory in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* that including his innovation. He refers some faculties to others and defines activities and Sentences for some that result to new conceptualizations from them [Suhrawardi, 2002a, p. 500–501].

Illuminated Imagination Theory Basics. Illuminated imagination theory focuses on thinking in its basics that the most important one is vision rule.

Suhrawardi has expressed this rule in several positions of *Hikmat al-Ishraq* and completed it generally. Then he explains Light of all lights science [Suhrawardi, 2002a, p. 376–377], all abstract lights science and also human external and internal senses [ibid., p. 502–503] based on vision theory. He invalidates and studies on different views about vision fact in detail in natural sciences of *al-Mashareh* and *al-Motarehat* and then refers secret of seeing to *Hikmat al-Ishraq* [ibid., p. 164–179].

He explains and invalidates vision theories like exit of radius from eye, reflection, impression and reasoning in the first part of *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. Then he studies on visible forms and concludes that these forms are not in mirror, air or eye. Reflection is neither the same object form based on reflection of mirror radius nor exactly the same object form that is seen except reflection and impression. Forms that the sages assume in eye lens are in fact same the visible forms, namely these forms are not in the air or lens or... This is method facility to express vision facts, visible forms and imagination [ibid., p. 269–270].

Vision rule will be more complete in the second part of *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. Suhrawardi says that because vision is neither based on visible object form impression in eye nor by exit of something from the eye, so it is related only on confronting a healthy eye and luminous object. It means that health of eye, light and confrontation are enough for vision. confrontation means lack of cover between eye and object. Of course much distance as well as nearby means coverage too. Suhrawardi will postpone the expression of imagination and Visible Ideas again [ibid., 2002a, p. 348].

On this basis that impression or exit, is not the necessity of vision and lack of cover is enough to reach to vision, science of Light of lights returns to his vision because he is self manifesting in himself and other from he are appear for him and there is no cover against him [ibid., p. 376–377] and all science of abstract lights and Lordly lights (*Esfahbod* lights) return to his vision [ibid., p. 503]. Suhrawardi's commentators know *Esfahbod* light and the Guiding light as rational soul. Bahai Lahiji believes *Esfahbod* means army leader in Pahlavi language and is called *Sepahbod* (general) in Persian and they called it *Esfahbod* due to presidency of rational soul in body and body forces [Bahai Lahiji, 1973, p. 146].

Suhrawardi has talked about vision fact distinctively and negatively. It is as if he wants to say that seeing is seeing and no more things. But Shahrezoori has added an affirmative expression to vision fact in discussion about appearance senses, after elementary emphasis of Suhrawardi. He says when there is a confrontation between a vision member and luminous object, for soul, there will be illuminated intuitive science on the visualized object and then soul will conceive the object Intuitively without any intermediate [Shahrezoori, 2002, p. 489; 2006, p. 391].

Illuminated Imagination. Suhrawardi's method in developing imagination theory is similar to his vision theory in the beginning of reasoning. He explains negatively and distinctively, what is not imagination. But Suhrawardi will add here an affirmative expression, unlike vision, about that what are imagination and *takhayol*.

Suhrawardi does not consider imagination as source of common sense unlike Avicenna. He concludes that there are no forgotten subjects in human faculties, by studying on reminiscence process, but they are true in reminder universe, and this universe is under design of Spherical *Esfahbod* lights or Spherical souls that they do not forget anything and there are not any oblivescence In the Universe.

His argument is that sometimes reminding a lost subject is very difficult and there is no success for human although he tries a lot. Then he will remind a subject accidentally. If there was a forgotten subject in human essence or in his physical faculties, it wouldn't be hidden from rational soul or the Guiding light, because obstacles cannot keep cover the Guiding light.

Imagination forms that the human will forget are similar and unlike Avicenna's opinion, imagination faculty is not the source of imaginary forms like memory faculty that is not the source of detail meanings. The reasoning is the same in both. According to the former reason, forgotten imagination forms are true in celestial universe and the Guiding light returns those forms from there.

Of course Suhrawardi accepts that there is a faculty in human to have reminding and reminiscence capacity [Suhrawardi, 2002a, p. 502]. Therefore memory and imagination faculties are regarded as faculties that can accept the forms and rules from celestial universe.

What is the fact of imagination? Suhrawardi considers the imaginary forms and Visible forms the same. As forms impression is impossible in eye or brain, Visible forms or imaginary forms are not impressed too. They are suspended bodies and without place that mirror and human imagination are their manifestation and because vision is soul intuitive illuminated observing, other appearance and inner senses refer to nature of the Guiding light, who is all-emanating by virtue of its essence and the Guiding light illuminates on imagination ideas and such that namely other appearance and inner senses. *Esfahbod* light illuminates on vision that there is no need to attain the form and its illumination on imagination is the same [ibid., p. 502–504]. Suhrawardi regards imagination (*takhayol*) as direct view of Ideal Beings by *Esfahbod* (Lordly) light.

Doctrine of Suhrawardi imagination is matching with his vision teachings from some points of views and thinking in it is useful to offer a correct notion from illuminated imagination:

1. Sight faculty is a physical faculty and also soul can see Ideal Beings of the mirrors by that. *Motekhayelah* and imagination faculties are the same in Suhrawardi point of view and are physical, and soul can see Ideal Beings through it.

2. Vision is qualified to confrontation; imaginary perception is also qualified to confrontation.

3. Vision is done without intermediate of object form; also imagination perception is without intermediate. It means nothing is coming from outside to mind and imaginary forms are suspended ideas that are per se perceiver as objects are per se object perceived.

4. In both cases, illuminated intuitive science is resulted for soul.

5. In both cases, cognation of perceiver and object perceived is impossible and the Guiding light that is abstract can see both of the physical objects and suspended ideas (that have incomplete abstract), as in objects perception by Light of lights and Ghahereh (Triumphal) lights, cognation is impossible.

6. Light is conditional in both cases: in vision, the object should be luminous, and in Ideas of mirrors also the light is auxiliary cause. In inner senses, both illumination of abstract lights and the Guiding light are necessary.

Affinities and Differences

Historical study of the views of the philosophers concerning imagination theory, explains the evolution of this theory and the persistent effect on posterity and innovations and inventions of each of them.

Aristotle has done researches on the nature of the imagination which are accepted by Farabi, Avicenna and Suhrawardi as the basis-material hence they were not elaborated. He analysed imagination as distinct from feeling, thought, belief, opinion, science and intellect, in addition to the imagination and feeling being similar and its relationship with the judgement. These insights were kept in the later philosophy.

Aristotle used the word *phantasia* for imagination. Farabi has not used this word to imagination and nor to any other thing. Avicenna applied the words *bantasia* and *phantasia* based on common sense. While Aristotle called the common sense as *sensus communis* [Aristotle, 1995, 425b27, 450a1, 686a31] Suhrawardi followed Avicenna in this matter.

Farabi does not consider the conceptualization of imagination or its distinctiveness from dubious and similar concepts as a problem. He received the teachings of Aristotle via tacit means and deals with activities and capabilities of imagination and its civil status. As Aristotle considered imagination and *takhayol* with a word *phantasia*, Farabi too does not consider duality between imagination and *takhayol* in the infinitive and between imagination and *motekhayelah* in the meaning of faculty.

He stated three tasks for *motekhayelah* based on three imaginary forms that can be distinguished: imaginary form that is sensible and is obtained from common sense, imaginary form that *motekhayelah* makes with possession in the first imaginary forms and their analysis and synthesis, and imaginary form that *motekhayelah* is invented by the representation of intelligibles and sensibles.

This tri-partite division is used in the conceptualization of the creativity of imagination. Especially the performance of imagination in imagining from intelligibles makes possible the power and specific capacity in order to form ideas and works of art. All three types are common in clear and distinctive features of substantive that Aristotle has expressed.

Farabi has also considered the ability of *motekhayelah* in understanding helpful and harmful, pleasurable and painful affairs.

Avicenna conceptualizes inner perceptive faculties. The faculties are based on a branch called *motekhayelah* and thought is considered as representation in five types and if they are considered as two faculties they are six types.

Are there any relation between faculties of imagination and *motekhayelah* in Avicenna with *motekhayelah* faculty in Farabi? Avicenna knows the imagination as a treasury of common sense which is responsible for maintaining sensibles forms, namely the first task of *motekhayelah* Farabi is independently for Avicenna imagination. Avicenna's *motekhayelah* is responsible for analyzing forms and their composition. It means to carry out the second activity of Farabi's *motekhayelah*. Avicenna considers perception as passion category and takes from dominion in forms to act of *motekhayelah* [Avicenna, 1983, p. 35]. He does not consider the third activity of Farabi's *motekhayeleah*, namely the representation. It should not be mentioned in addition to the perceptions and interactions of faculties.

In summary, the same interaction which Farabi considers for *motekhayelah*, Avicenna considers for two faculties, namely imagination and *motekhayelah* and does not consider the representation. It can be said that Farabi's *motekhayelah* includes Avicenna's estimative faculty because Farabi considers *motekhayelah* faculty capable of understanding pleasure, pain, benefite and detrimental affairs. It means Farabi's *motekhayelah* can find meanings in all these.

While Avicenna considers estimative faculty responsible for perceiving the sensibles, as Farabi has not differentiated the estimative faculty, it is not necessary to separate the memory—that is, the treasury of partial meanings. It seems that Avicenna considers Farabi's *motekhayelah* faculty as one of the four faculties of imagination, *motekhayelah*, estimative and memory. It is basically impossible to separate sensible affairs in particular meaning from sensible forms. So Avicenna in his book of *Isharat va Tanbihat* divides the perception in three kinds of feeling, imagination and intellection and put illusion in his other works.

Another point that needs mentioning is that in some works of Farabi we can see inner cognitive faculties. In *Fusus al-Hikam* the faculties of representation, imagination, memory, thought and *motekhayelah* are defined using the same terms as Avicenna's works [Shanab Ghazani, 2003, p. 67]. Also, the common limit phrase is mentioned between the outward and the inward that exponents are stated for it equivalent of common sense [See: Shanab Ghazani, 2003, p. 164; Astarabadi, 1980, p. 320]. In addition, in *Uyun al-Masayel* we have *motekhayelah*, imagination, recollection and thought without a definition for them [See: Farabi, 1930a; 1930b, p. 9–10].

Various methods can be used to clarify this issue. One is that Farabi uses different phrases in different places, for the validities of cognitive faculties and he expresses their differences are in terms of brevity and detail. This probability is altered. Because Farabi in *motekhayelah* activities has not named detailed names of faculties.

In addition, Farabi defined illusion as follows: 'the illusion is that we have something in imagination while it does not exist' [Farabi, 1987, p. 162]. This definition is equivalent to lexical meaning of illusion and does not resemble sinaian conceptualization.

Another possibility is that Farabi changes his opinion. This possibility is not very notable. In other words, the path is not clear for such a change in the works of Farabi. Another difference is that some works do not belong to Farabi, as some Arab and European

researchers denied belonging *Fusus al-Hikam* to Farabi while some have attributed it to Avicenna and also there are serious doubts in the document of *Uyun al-Masayel* and *al-Daavy al-Qalbiyeh* [See: Georr, 1946, p. 31–39; Pines, 1951, p. 121–126; Strauss, 1934, p. 99–139; Michot, 1982, p. 50–231; Cruz, 1950–1951, p. 23–303; Rahman, 1979]. Their approach is mainly referring to the terms, concepts and theories contained in these books and have deduced most of the arguments from topics of the soul.

However, the inner cognitive faculties that are conceptualized in the works of Avicenna returns to Suhrawardi as a unit faculty in marshalling light [Suhrawardi, 2002a, p. 502]. Suhrawardi knows the imaginary perceptions as suspended forms and creatures of the imaginal world that they are self existent and no subsistence of the human mind. In his perspective, Imaginary perceptions is a kind of intuitive emanative knowledge and direct observation suspended forms and subsisting from marshalling light. Imaginary forms occupy a stage from the outside world.

Conclusions

Farabi conceptualizes *motekhayelah* faculty as a faculty responsible for keeping sensibles forms, their possession and representation of the intelligible and sensible by them. Avicenna conceptualizes faculties of imagination, *motekhayelah*, estimative and memory as opposed to Farabi *motekhayelah* faculty. He does not mention the representation. Suhrawardi gives different explanation about imaginary perception and understands it as observation of suspended forms by the self. Of course, this does not mean that deprivation of activities of maintenance, possession and representation. It just means a different explanation.

It seems that the most complete imagination theory for conceptualizing imagination is Farabi's theory that is based on four degrees of creativity: the imagination of forms derived from the same sensibles, the imagination of forms derived from possession in the sensibles, the imagination of the forms that the mind can invent in the representation of sensibles and imagination of the forms that the mind invents in the representation of intelligibles.

Образы воображения у иранских философов

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В данной статье сделана попытка представить теорию воображения, основанную на различных идеях, в том числе идеях философии искусства. Хотя такие философы, как Фараби, Авиценна и Сухраварди, опираются на отдельные положения аристотелевской теории воображения, они расширяют ее, добавляя новые стадии процесса воображения. Концепция воображения, предложенная Фараби, включает три основных действия: сохранение чувственных форм; сочетание и разложение чувственных форм; образное представление. Авиценна разделяет то, что Фараби называл способностью воображения, на три способности: воображения, оценки и памяти. Сухраварди критикует теорию Авиценны и предлагает разделять воображение внутреннее и внешнее. Воображающее восприятие он представляет как озарение, интуитивное знание, подразумевающее созерцание застывших форм, на основании которого наш разум строит внешний мир.

Ключевые слова: воображение, художественное творчество, Аристотель, Фараби, Авиценна, Сухраварди

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