Dignāga on the Definition of Perception in the Vādaviddhi of Vasubandhu A Historical and Philosophical Reconstruction of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (1.13-16)

Abstract

The paper investigates a fragment from Dignāga’s magnum opus Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (“Body of tools for reliable knowledge with a commentary”, 1, 13-16) where Dignāga challenges Vasubandhu’s definition of perception in the Vādaviddhi (“Rules of the dispute”). The definition from the Vādaviddhi is being compared in the paper with Vasubandhu’s ideas of perception in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (“Encyclopedia of Abhidharma with the commentary”), and with Dignāga’s own definition of valid perception in the first part of his Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti as well as in his Ālambanaparīkśavṛtti (“Investigation of the Object with the commentary”). The author puts forward the hypothesis that Dignāga criticizes the definition of perception in Vādaviddhi for the reason that it does not correspond to the teachings of Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, to which he, Dignāga, referred earlier in his magnum opus. This helps Dignāga to justify his statement that Vasubandhu himself considered Vādaviddhi as not containing the essence of his teaching (asāra). In addition, the article reconstructs the logical sequence in Dignāga’s exegesis: he criticizes the Vādaviddhi definition from the representational standpoint of Sautrāntika school, by showing that it does not fulfill the function prescribed by Indian logic to definition, that of distinguishing perception from the classes of heterogeneous and homogeneous phenomena. Having proved the impossibility of moving further according to the “realistic logic” based on recognizing the existence of an external object, Dignāga interprets the Vādaviddhi’s definition in terms of linguistic philosophy, according to which the language refers not to external objects and not to the unique and private sensory experience (svalakṣaṇa-qualia), but to the general characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), which are mental constructs (kalpanā).