Features of Phenomenological Approach in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

This study is devoted to the analysis of the peculiarities of the phenomenological approach in analytical
philosophy of mind. Today, phenomenology in the analytical philosophy of mind is increasingly
strengthening its position. This is due to the problem of limited naturalistic approach to
the study of consciousness. It is shown that unlike the strategies of continental tradition, analytical
philosophy of mind by default uses the language and apparatus of naturalistic philosophy. The lat -
ter is understood as the ontology of natural objects and the motive of their primacy. The article
analyzes some means of analytical philosophy of mind, which are positioned as phenomenological,
but do not always preserve the authenticity of the phenomenological methodology. It is
shown that the peculiarities of the phenomenological approach in the analytical philosophy of
mind are connected with certain drawbacks of traditional phenomenology, namely, the gap with
the language of science and the lack of sufficient opportunities for dialogue between scientists and
philosophers. The phenomenological approach in analytical philosophy of, on the contrary, offers a
number of tools to demonstrate the peculiarities of consciousness as an “object of research” on the
territory of science itself. The article shows some of these tools and gives their analysis in comparison
with the traditional Husserl phenomenology. The article resumes that the consequence of scientific
convertibility is the preservation of the residual naturalist material (dictionary of science)
within the analytical versions of the phenomenology. It does not allow the authentically apply the traditional phenomenological approaches to the study of consciousness in analytical philosophy.
At the same time, it is shown that further development of the traditions of analytical philosophy
and phenomenology can develop the productive dialogue.