Richard Swinburne’s Cartesian Dualism and Eleonore Stump’s Hylomorphism: Comparative Analysis

Abstract

The article makes a comparative analysis of R. Swinburne’s Cartesian dualism and E. Stump’s Thomistic hylomorphism. These authors are among the few contemporary philosophers who argue for strong dualist positions contrary to physicalism in the philosophy of mind. The main motivation for the comparative analysis lies in the fact that Swinburne’s and Stump’s projects compete both with strong physicalist tendencies and with each other. The author of the article analyses the content of Swinburne’s and Stump’s systems, and provides the main criticism of Cartesian dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism. The distinction between Cartesian dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism is examined. A number of similarities between the positions of Swinburne and Stump are highlighted, but philosophically significant differences are also observed. The author concludes that, despite having its own significant philosophical problems, Stump’s Thomistic hylomorphism is superior to Swinburne’s dualism in a number of aspects and has more prospects for defense.