Meinong’s Theory of Assumptions

Abstract

The article clarifies the reasons why A. Meinong expands the classification of mental phenomena proposed by F. Brentano and places the class of assumptions between the classes of presentations and judgments. Meinong understands acts of assumption as propositional acts, the specificity of which is that they lack the affirmative force or the moment of seriousness characteristic for acts of judgment. Meinong demonstrates the impossibility of reducing the acts of assumption to the acts of presentation on the example of negative assumptions: the negative characteristics of objects grasped in such assumptions are not captured by the presentations. It is demonstrated that the theory of modes of presentation put forward by Brentano and Marty in response to this argument of Meinong does not allow us to defend the thesis of the reducibility of assumptions to presentations: even with the help of a new notion of presentation, it is not possible to explain such phenomena as play, pretense and lies without artificial complications. The article goes on to discuss some of the details of Meinong’s semantic theory that are in need for resolving the issue of the difference between assumptions and judgments. The author points out the peculiarity of Meinong's understanding of words and sentences meanings, and gives a brief description of the theory of objectives. After the explanations made, an argument is discussed that allows Meinong to justify the difference between acts of assumption and acts of judgment. The argument is constructed as a sequential analysis of sentences, the task is to show that sentences of different types, both simple, and loaded with subordinate clauses, and composite, in different circumstances express a propositional attitude devoid of affirmative force.